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Powers and Rights in Shelby County v. Holder
What is the right level of review that the Court should apply when examining
congressional actions under section two of the Fifteenth Amendment, which gives
Congress the power to enforce the right to vote for citizens of all races? In her dissent in
Shelby County v. Holder, Justice Ginsberg argues that the appropriate level of scrutiny is
rational review.1 She defends deference to Congress in executing the means to realize the
rights guaranteed in 15.1. The decision resembles how the Court’s more liberal justices
have approached the Commerce Clause, where they also stress the importance of
deference to Congress and the requirement of rational review.
Despite Ginsberg’s attempt to frame the debate over Shelby County as one of
Congressional power and judicial deference, I argue that a close reading of the opinions
in this case demonstrates that the issue must fundamentally be one about the meaning of
civil rights, not about congressional power. Ginsberg’s dissent relies on a procedural
view of judicial deference that is divorced from substantive questions of what civil rights
are at stake. By contrast, I argue that Shelby County ultimately concerns a color
conscious versus a color-blind understanding of the Constitution. By avoiding the
substantive issue of civil rights, Ginsberg, abandons the metaphor of the “ratchet test”
proposed by Justice Brennan in Katzenbach v. Morgan.2 Brennan wrote that when
Congress is expanding the scope of rights, it is entitled to judicial deference, but when it
is regressing on rights that have already been recognized by courts, it is not entitled to
judicial deference. Congress should have the power to “ratchet up” or increase the
protection of rights above what courts have secured, but it should not be allowed to
“ratchet down” or roll back the protection of rights below the level of the courts. I show
that the ratchet test should be revived, and that it requires a substantive view about what
rights ought to be protected.
In contemporary decisions about Congress’ power to act relative to the states, liberals
have sought to turn the debate to the level of scrutiny that is appropriate. Before turning
to the interpretation of the 15th amendment and in particular 15.2 in Shelby County, it is
helpful to at least briefly mention a similar debate in jurisprudence about the Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. In Commerce Clause cases, Justice Breyer has emphasized the
connection between rational review, which he regards as the appropriate level of scrutiny,
and the requirement of judicial deference to the legislature. Breyer argues that the
question is not whether interstate commerce exists in any one instance, but whether
Congress has a rational basis for believing that interstate commerce exists. The standard
suggests that the Court should defer to Congress on whether there is interstate commerce,
which Congress would then have the power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. The
conservatives on the Robert’s Court have not responded to this challenge. They have
arguably invoked a higher level of scrutiny for Commerce Clauses cases without
admitting it and without explaining why these cases need greater scrutiny. The
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unanswered implication is that the conservative justices are arbitrarily increasing the
level of scrutiny in these cases.
This debate is echoed in Shelby County. Justice Ginsberg argues that rational basis
review is appropriate in examining whether Congress has acted appropriately in
reauthorizing the pre-clearance provisions of section V of the Voting Rights Act. Her
argument for rational review, as I understand it, hinges on the assumption that the 15.1
claim about the right to vote is not at issue here. This case is instead about the procedure
or means that Congress used to secure those rights. The issue is one of power; on her
view Congress has suitably proposed means to secure the right that meet the appropriate
standard of rational basis review.
The argument is importantly distinct from the argument given by the Court in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach as well as Katzenbach v. Morgan, the decision that grounded the
so-called ratchet test.3 Justice Brennan famously argued in Morgan that the Court should
defer to legislatures when they are “ratching up” the level of protection of rights but not
when they are ratcheting down that protection. Brennan proposes the ratchet test to
respond to worries that judicial deference to Congress might fail to protect the rights of
citizens. The Court clarifies in both cases that Congress’ actions are not only rational but
are matters of constitutional obligation. The Congress had a constitutional obligation to
pass the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to correct violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of equal protection of the law and the Fifteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
voting rights.
Although Ginsburg cites both cases, she is careful to avoid using the ratchet metaphor.
Her argument appeals to deference to Congressional authority; it is not an argument for
why Congress has a constitutional obligation to protect the voting rights of the Fifteenth
Amendment. She gives evidence about the importance and effectiveness of the
legislation, and she stresses that it is working. But this is a somewhat lukewarm
endorsement of the legislation. Notably, she does not recognize that Congress is
“ratcheting up” rights protection to fulfill its constitutional obligations to prevent
violations of civil rights under 14.1 and 15.1 of the Constitution.
There may be good reasons for Ginsburg to focus on the question of congressional power
under 15.2, rather than the meaning of voting rights in 15.1. One reason might be that the
Court might have been seen as having abandoned the ratchet test Boerne v. Flores.4 But
that worry might be misplaced, since the case concerned an attempt to reverse the Court’s
reasoning in Employment Division v. Smith.5 Bourne did not address whether Congress
could expand rights protections beyond what was recognized by the Court.
Another reason why Ginsburg focused on Congressional power in Shelby County might
be that she was trying to avoid a confrontation between the liberal and conservative
wings of the Court. That disagreement centers whether the Constitution should be
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colorblind or color conscious. The conservatives on the Court believe that the
Constitution should be color blind, and that it prohibits taking account of race. Public
policy and constitutional interpretation should not acknowledge race. But for liberals on
the Court, color blindness ignores the history of civil rights violations. To enforce civil
rights today, the government needs to rectify past injustices that still affect the way that
politics, including voting rights, are shaped. In short, there is no way to correct the
legacy of racism without taking race into account.
Ginsberg may be seeking to avoid this battle. Perhaps the reason is strategic. She might
think that she can ultimately win an argument over Congress’ power to act in a way that
passes rational review. This would sidestep the more difficult task of convincing the
conservatives on the Court about the need for color conscious rectifications of past civil
rights violations.
On my view, however, there is no avoiding this battle over the color conscious versus the
colorblind constitution. Ginsburg’s dissent ignores the core logic of the majority opinion.
The majority opinion, as I interpret it, is motivated by a concern that Congress is acting to
contrive a basic right or that it is on the verge of doing so. Justice Roberts is clear that
some of Congress’ provisions might violate the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence
regarding racial redistricting. Clearly, if Congress is violating core equal protection
rights, the right level of scrutiny is not rational review but the more demanding standard
of strict scrutiny. Yet Roberts never fully makes that point. Instead, he seems to assume
that heightened scrutiny is required. But why? Perhaps he is assuming that heightened
scrutiny is required because Congress is violating or risks violating the penumbra of
equal protection. Ultimately, it seems that the majority’s requirement of heightened
scrutiny is motivated by objections to the race conscious requirements of the Voting
Rights Act’s pre-clearance provisions and the Act’s attempt to recognize the existence of
past racism. Ginsburg should criticize the majority’s attack on the race conscious aspects
of the Voting Rights Act. She should say what critics of the Court’s Seattle decision
have said quite clearly.6 It is impossible to do any of the work of enforcement of the
Fifteenth Amendment in a color blind way. A colorblind interpretation just cannot make
sense of the history of attempts to disenfranchise African-American voters. A race
conscious analysis of changes to voting requirements is necessary because of the history
of racial discrimination in voting.
This argument would enter into a substantive discussion of the meaning of the Civil
Rights Amendments as race conscious attempts to rectify the subordination of AfricanAmericans. It would not be a procedural argument about judicial deference to the
legislature. In other words, it would be an argument about the meaning of civil rights
under our post-Civil War Constitution.
Central to the majority decision is a principle of “equal sovereignty” between the states. I
am not sure what to make of this principle. It seems to attribute an entitlement to states
against “discrimination” that is analogous to the entitlement of individuals to equal
protection of the laws. In particular it is the fact of different treatment between States that
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is part of the pre-clearance formula that constitutes an analogous form of discrimination
to individuals distinctions based on race. But why should we believe that states have an
equivalent entitlement to non-discrimination to individuals? Here I am at a loss. The
majority simply seems to be engaging in an anthropomorphism of States. This
argument has echoes of the rhetoric of the “dignity” of states prominent in Rehnquist’s’
Sovereign Immunity decisions, which I criticize in a forthcoming law review article.
Perhaps what is really at stake here is again a view about color-blind constitutionalism.
The Court seems to assume that in addition to discrimination based on race against
individuals, equally troubling is color-conscious policies that discriminate between
States. Despite the puzzling claim about equal sovereignty, what really might be going
on is an objection to race conscious policies because they accuse the State’s of racism, a
double sin of invoking race and unequal treatment. On my view, however, even if there
are concerns about such unequal treatment, the simple fact that the States are not actual
people but government entities suggest that this concern is not as weighty as the majority
claims.
Traditional federalism also has a kind of flight from substance. One worry about
deferring to Congress on matters of 15.2 jurisprudence is that deference will reduce the
powers of the states. But I take it that states that engaged in non-colorblind polices
would also be infringing on these rights. The actions of those states should be struck
down under 15.2. This suggests that states’ rights is not the relevant issue. The
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments create individual rights that constrain all levels of
government power. The real issue is the color-blind or color-conscious meaning of those
rights, including voting rights and rights to equal protection of the law.
This attempt by liberals to flee from substance to a procedural realm of judicial deference
and rational review is present not just in the dissent in Shelby County but in the liberal
attempts to criticize the Roberts Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The liberal
justices have repeatedly argued that the right level of analysis in regard to congressional
power over commerce is also rational review. But this misses what could be an even
more direct criticism of the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence. The conservative justices are
assuming that heightened scrutiny is required for both the Commerce Clause and 15.1,
because Congress risks encroaching on a basic right. In Shelby Roberts’ allies are
wrongly assuming that race-conscious policies violate civil rights. In Sebilius, they are
assuming that commercial rights, including the right not to purchase, are substantively
protected by the Constitution.7 Ginsberg and the liberal justices should not respond
merely with a procedural argument about congressional power. They must articulate a
substantive view of what are rights are required by the Constitution. Liberals cannot and
should not avoid the battle over between the color-conscious and color-blind
understandings of civil rights by focusing on issues of procedural power rather than the
substance of rights. And liberals should not avoid the battle of progressive as opposed to
libertarian understandings of economic rights by focusing on issues of judicial deference
to Congress powers under the Commerce Clause.
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